Another Year Of Americans Eating Dangerously: A Retrospective of 2008 Food Contamination Coverage Decisions

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For a third consecutive year, Americans began a new year enduring another international food contamination outbreak. Like the two previous years, the outbreak involves a staple of the American diet. And, similar to the 2006 outbreak, the All-American food under attack is peanut butter.

The Peanut Corporation of America (“PCA”) outbreak is one of the largest food contamination outbreaks in U.S. food history. Over 654 sickened in 44 states and Canada, including 9 deaths, and over 2,600 products recalled.1 Over half of the victims are children. One in five of the victims has required hospitalization. Despite these critical numbers, certain knowledgeable experts believe Americans dodged a bullet.2

The PCA outbreak highlights several industry related issues we have examined over the past few years. The consolidation and centralization of food production and supply; the growing complexity of food manufacturing and distribution; the increased appetite for processed foods; and evolved food pathogens are just certain of the potential causes leading to larger and deadlier outbreaks.

As the Director of the FDA’s Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition admitted, this outbreak is “among the largest recalls that we’ve had.”3 Surprisingly, PCA supplied only 1% of the nation’s peanut products. Due to the increased consolidation and complexity of food production and distribution, a minor supplier caused a critically significant international outbreak. Moreover, this small supplier has created liability and coverage issues throughout the entire supply chain as each link of the chain will face questions, claims and litigation.
American’s appetite for processed food has also contributed to the size of the outbreak. Based on the current findings of the investigation, most peanut butter sold in jars appears to be safe. In fact, the manufacturer of JIF peanut butter has taken out full-page ads proclaiming the safety of its product. However, the vast majority of the over 2,600 recalled products are processed foods. Pre-packaged meals, cereal, energy bars and snack foods lead the long list of recalled foods.

A significant future concern raised by this outbreak is the possibility of another international outbreak involving a multi-drug resistant pathogen such as salmonella. *Salmonella Typhimurium* is the strain linked to the PCA outbreak. Almost a quarter of *Salmonella Typhimurium* bacteria are resistant to several of the most widely used antibiotics, certain of which doctors are comfortable giving to children. Moreover, certain *Typhimurium* bacteria are resistant to antibiotics of last resort. Though none of the drug-resistant bacteria have been identified with this outbreak, we may not be so lucky next time.

As the food contamination outbreaks and product recalls have grown in size and complexity, so too has the litigation response. Several lawsuits have been filed around the country, including a declaratory judgment action by PCA’s insurer.

The critically relevant question raised is whether international and national outbreaks and product recalls are covered by traditional insurance products.

As we have recently learned, PCA knowingly and intentionally shipped contaminated products. As more damaging information from FBI raids and Congressional investigations is released, it appears PCA is unlikely to gain coverage from its insurers. However, the issue of coverage for dozens of PCA’s food manufacturer customers raises a much more complex set of questions.

On the first-party side, many of PCA’s food industry customers will seek coverage for the resulting recall losses. Over the course of the investigation, we understand that the FDA has been visiting PCA customer facilities in order to address and remediate the cross-contamination issues. These events usually result in costs associated with the temporary shut-down of operations in order to clean and contend with contamination issues. The multifaceted costs connected with the actual recall of products will also quickly mount. Loss of market and customers will result in claims. Under business interruption coverage, issues such as business income, extra expense, period of restoration and loss determination will be raised by the PCA outbreak.

Another issue raised under first-party policies is whether there has been a direct physical loss. Though many would initially assume so, there is the very real likelihood for many insureds that no direct physical loss has taken place. The very same issue was at stake in the Canadian Mad Cow Embargo a few years ago. Additionally, the application of certain exclusions, such as the pollution, contamination, governmental action and faulty workmanship exclusions, may be found to exclude coverage for all or certain of the related losses. Spoliation issues may also have a significant impact on coverage issues.

In the third-party context, critical, complex issues will be raised. For PCA’s insurer, additional insured claims have likely been tendered or will be shortly. Though PCA’s claims are unlikely to be covered, the additional insureds do not face the same coverage hurdles. However, PCA’s insurance resources are sure to fall considerably short of the mark.

With over 654 sickened in 44 states and 9 deaths, bodily injury claims from across the country will also likely be tendered. Though the acute symptoms associated with salmonella will be at the forefront of these claims, the issue of long-term effects will have to be considered. As alleged in certain of the lawsuits filed in association with the PCA outbreak, salmonella poisoning can lead to chronic disease. Scientists are only beginning to research the possible connection between food poisoning and long-term illness. The potential long-term effects raise issues of medical monitoring claims and whether such claims are covered under traditional third-party insurance. The courts that have wrestled with this issue are split.

An issue raised as to both bodily injury and property damage claims is the number of occurrences. The vast majority of courts determine the number of occurrences by identifying the cause of the loss rather than the effect. There are an overwhelming number of
potential causes involved with an international food contamination outbreak. Factors such as the number of contaminated product batches, the number of individual shipments, the respective decisions to ship contaminated products, the preparation of contaminated products and the sale of contaminated products, all may be determinative. Moreover, though many jurisdictions use the same standard, the question of whether a single occurrence or multiple occurrences took place will likely result in many different and potentially conflicting decisions.

Property damage claims associated with the PCA outbreak will involve novel and significant issues. The threshold issue of whether property damage took place will have to be addressed. As voluntary recalls of over 2,600 products have taken place, the fundamental question that must be addressed is which products were actually physically injured by salmonella contamination. Insureds will also seek coverage under the product incorporation doctrine and claim related loss of use damages.

As discussed above, though PCA supplied only 1% of the nation’s peanut products, it has created liability and coverage issues throughout the entire supply chain. In this regard, wholesalers and retailers as well as others will seek coverage under applicable vendor’s endorsements.

A significant number of issues will be determined by the application of exclusions. Generally, the application of several common exclusions will be addressed in the context of the PCA outbreak. For example, the sistership exclusion is usually at issue with product recall matters. Though the exclusion appears to be applicable as to most product recall claims, certain courts have strictly construed the exclusion and narrowed its application.

As general liability policies were never intended to cover damages arising out of an insured’s faulty work or product, the application of the business risk exclusions should always be at issue in the product recall context. Specifically, the application of the damage to your product and impaired property exclusions will raise significant issues.

An exclusion that should be critically at issue in the PCA outbreak, though most will not initially consider its application, is the pollution exclusion. The majority of courts that have applied the exclusion in the product recall context have rejected the argument that the exclusion merely applies in the industrial pollution context.

Certain policies may contain other less common exclusions that will also be applicable in the context of the PCA outbreak.

Among another host of issues to be considered is the potential violation of the voluntary payments provision by insureds involved in the PCA outbreak. Unless they have previously sought their insurers’ consent, involved insureds may violate the voluntary payments condition contained in almost all third-party liability policies.

The PCA outbreak has already resulted in at least one coverage action that will address the complex and emerging issues involved with recent food contamination outbreaks and product recalls. In 2008, we monitored the coverage decisions in which courts addressed certain of the emerging and multifaceted issues. We review the significant decisions.

I. First-Party Property / All-Risk Policy Coverage Issues

A. Direct Physical Loss


The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California refused to apply various exclusions to exclude coverage for an insured’s pitted nectarines. Gerawan Farming Partners v. Westchester Surplus Lines Ins. Co., et al., No. 05-1186, slip op., 2008 WL 80711 (E.D.Cal. Jan. 4, 2008). Gerawan Farming Partners, Inc. (“Gerawan”) owns, grows, packs, and processes stone fruit, such as nectarines. In August 2003, Gerawan discovered that a number of its nectarines were suffering from “pitting,” a cosmetic problem that affects the surface of the fruit and is characterized by multiple small craters on the surface. Gerawan, 2008 WL 80711 at *1. Although pitting is not uncommon, 2003 noticed an explosion of pitting beyond what had occurred in prior years. Thus, Gerawan
made a claim under its all-risk commercial property policy issued by Westchester Surplus Lines Ins. Co. (“Westchester”), which was subsequently denied in December 2004, after a lengthy investigation. *Id.* at *1, *5. Westchester’s denial was based in Gerawan’s inability to show a covered cause of loss as well as approximately 14 policy exclusions.

The Court noted that the policy provided coverage for direct physical loss of or damage to covered property caused by or resulting from any covered cause of loss. *Id.* at *9. In discussing the initial grant of coverage, the Court rejected Westchester’s argument that Gerawan was required to show that the loss of the nectarines was caused by a covered peril. *Id.* at 11-13. Because the “covered cause of loss” definition essentially duplicated the requirement of a physical loss or damage, the Court reasoned that the policy covered all risks of direct physical loss, unless otherwise excluded or limited. *Id.* at *13. As such, because the pitting is a physical condition that caused the loss of, or damage to, the nectarines, the Court held that Gerawan had met its burden of showing a covered loss. *Id.*

The Court next addressed Westchester’s arguments that the latent defects and growing crop exclusions applied because expert opinions established that growing conditions in the field caused the nectarines to develop weakened lenticals not observable to the naked eye, thereby later causing the pitting. *Id.* at *13. In denying summary judgment for Westchester, the Court noted that the parties’ experts disagreed as to the cause of the pitting, as Gerawan submitted evidence that the pitting occurred only after its packing and processing procedures were applied to the nectarines. *Id.* at *16. Because the pitting may have been caused by extraneous factors not inherent in the nectarines, the Court held that summary judgment would not be appropriate. *Id.* at *16-17. Similarly, the Court held that the exclusion for growing crops, which applies to damage done to crops that are unharvested or unsevered from the land, is not applicable because the pitting occurred after harvest and after the nectarines were subjected to Gerawan’s packing and processing procedures. *Id.* at *17-18.

Finally, the Court refused to apply an exclusion for marring, disfiguring marks or blemishes that occur naturally over time because the evidence suggested the 2003 pitting was an “explosion” that exceeded prior years and was unexpected. *Id.* at *18-20. The Court reasoned that while the evidence suggested the nectarines pitted after they were packed and processed in the usual and customary manner, the evidence also indicated that the pitting was unusual and extraordinary. *Id.* at *20. Thus, the Court concluded that summary judgment was inappropriate.

B. The Pollution Exclusion

*Something’s Fishy! The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida Finds a Conflict Between an All-Risk Policy’s Pollution Exclusion and Pollutant Cleanup and Removal Provision.*

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied an insurer’s motion to dismiss, reasoning that a Pollution Exclusion and a Pollutant Cleanup and Removal provision in an all-risk policy created an “ambiguity as to the extent of the exclusion's application.” *SeаСpecialties, Inc. v. Westport Ins. Corp.,* No. 08-20917-CIV-MORENO at 5-6 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 11, 2008) (order denying motion to dismiss).

After SeaSpecialties, Inc. (“SeaSpecialties”) facility and certain product tested positive for *listeria monocytogenes* in January 2005, SeaSpecialties suspended production and issued product recalls. *SeаСpecialties,* No. 08-20917-CIV-MORENO at 2. SeaSpecialties implemented safety measures, but it nevertheless had another recall and halted its operations. *Id.* It then filed for bankruptcy. *Id.*

SeaSpecialties submitted a claim to Westport Insurance Corporation (“Westport”), which denied coverage based upon application of the policy’s Pollution Exclusion. *Id.* at 4. The Pollution Exclusion excluded coverage for the “discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape” of pollutants, unless directly caused by physical loss or damage not otherwise excluded. *Id.* (internal quotations omitted). The policy’s definition of “pollutants” included bacteria. *Id.*

In examining the policy, the court found a provision that it felt created an ambiguity, despite the fact that the parties did not reference the provision. *Id.* at 5. The policy section outlining covered expenses contained a Pollutant Cleanup Removal provision, which stated that costs for cleanup and removal of pollutants directly caused by physical loss or damage not other-
wise excluded were covered. *Id.* The court, though, found that the Pollutant Cleanup Removal provision “provided coverage for cleanup and removal of pollutants unless . . . otherwise exclude[d].” *Id.* at 6.

The court reasoned that the Pollutant Cleanup Removal provision conflicted with the Pollution Exclusion. *Id.* As such, the court concluded that, at that point in the litigation, it was unclear whether the Pollution Exclusion excluded coverage and denied Westport’s motion to dismiss. *Id.*

The *SeaSpecialties* decision is significant because it illustrates the court’s misapplication of policy terms and definitions in an attempt to find coverage for the insured. The Pollutant Cleanup Removal provision described which pollutant cleanup costs would be covered when a covered cause of loss directly caused the dispersal of pollutants. That is, the Pollutant Cleanup Removal provision did not expand coverage under the policy, it only described what costs the carrier would pay if a covered cause of loss occurred. Because the insured did not allege a covered cause of loss directly caused its damages, the court should have applied the Pollution Exclusion and granted the carrier’s motion to dismiss. *Id.*

**C. 2007 Decisions Confirmed**


1. **Business Pursuit Exclusion**

The *Hueske* decision construed a first-party Farm/Ranch policy and an umbrella policy issued by State Farm Fire & Casualty Company. Both policies contained similar business pursuits exclusions, which excluded coverage for property damage arising out of the insured’s business pursuits. Because the insured had sold several thousand tons of corn syrup to ranchers over the course of two years, the court concluded that insured’s activities were continuous and motivated by profit. *Hueske*, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 1749. Accordingly, the court held that the business pursuits exclusion applied to exclude coverage for the claimants’ claims. *Id.* On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed, adopting the “reasons stated in the [district court’s] thorough and well-reasoned opinion.”

2. **Vermin Exclusion**

The *Truitt* decision construed a vermin exclusion in a first-party policy issued by Ace American Insurance Company. The exclusion provided that a loss caused by vermin was excluded “unless caused by a Covered Cause of Loss not excluded elsewhere” in the policy. An exception to the exclusion, however, provided that losses from vermin are excluded “only if the vermin infestation was, in turn, caused by a different exclusion in the policy.” Because the alleged infestation was caused by poor sanitation practices, and the insurer provided no evidence showing that a risk excluded in a separate provision of the policy caused the rat infestation, the court concluded that summary judgment in favor of the insureds was appropriate. The Georgia Supreme Court denied *certiorari*, and as such, the appellate court’s decision construing an exception within an exclusion stands.

**II. Third-Party Liability Coverage Issues**

**A. “Occurrence” / “Property Damage”**

1. **Risks Associated with the Global Food Supply Chain. U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey Denies an Insurer’s Summary Judgment Motion, Reasoning that a CGL Policy May Cover Claims Related to Mercury-Contaminated Vanilla Beans.**

food, and then distributed it to various food manufacturers, including International Flavors & Fragrances, Inc. (“International Flavors”), which processed the food and in turn passed it on for consumption. Id. at *2-3.

Dammann entered into a contract to provide International Flavors with vanilla beans, which International Flavors used to make vanilla extract. Id. at *3. International Flavors discovered that certain lots of Indonesian vanilla beans imported by Dammann were contaminated with mercury, and notified both the Food & Drug Administration and Dammann that the contamination was likely caused by injections of mercury into the vanilla beans by Indonesian farmers seeking to boost the weight of their crop yields. Id. at *3-4. International Flavors then submitted a claim letter to Dammann, seeking over $5 million in damages for losses associated with using 5 metric tons of contaminated vanilla beans to make vanilla extract. Id. at *4-5. International Flavor’s alleged damages consisted of: the value of vanilla extract already shipped to customers; the value of vanilla extract not yet shipped to customers; and remediation and cleaning costs associated with the de-contamination of its processing equipment. Id.

Dammann’s broker subsequently tendered a notice of claim to Travelers, notifying Travelers of International Flavor’s claim against Dammann. Id. at *5. Travelers denied coverage, explaining that International Flavor’s alleged losses did not constitute “property damage” caused by an “occurrence.” Id. at *5-6. In addition, Travelers also explained that the contractual liability exclusion and business risk exclusion excluded coverage for International Flavor’s alleged losses. Id. at *6. Anticipating that Dammann and/or International Flavors would bring suit against it due to the denial of coverage, Travelers filed an affirmative declaratory relief action and moved for summary judgment. Id. at *4.

In denying Travelers’ summary judgment motion, the court first reasoned that, despite the fact that suit had not been filed against Dammann, the allegations in International Flavor’s claim letter to Dammann adequately set forth a claim for “property damage” caused by an “occurrence.” Id. at *10-12. Travelers argued that International Flavor’s claims did not constitute an “occurrence” because they arose out of the contract between Dammann and International Flavors, and not out of a tort obligation. Id. at *13. Relying on Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 81 N.J. 233, 249 (1979), the court disagreed and concluded that International Flavor’s claims articulated circumstances that rose above a “mere accident of faulty workmanship, and instead constitute[d] faulty workmanship that [caused] an accident.” Id. at *12 (citing Weedo, 81 N.J. at 249) (internal quotations omitted). Because Dammann’s failure to conform its product to the terms of the contract also allegedly caused resultant property damage to International Flavors, the court held that International Flavor’s claim letter sufficiently alleged an “occurrence” under the policy. Id. at *14.

Travelers also argued that because International Flavor’s claims related to vanilla extract made from Dammann’s product, the claims did not allege “property damage,” and were therefore, excluded under the CGL policy. Id. at *16-17. The court again disagreed and reasoned that because International Flavor’s allegations included damage to vanilla extract and processing equipment, which are tangible property, the claim letter sufficiently alleged “property damage” under the policy. Id. at *18. Travelers next argued that certain business risk exclusions, including Exclusion k. (“Damage to Your Product Exclusion”); Exclusion m. (“Damage to Impaired Property not Physically Injured Exclusion”); and Exclusion n. (“Recall of Products, Work or Impaired Property Exclusion”) applied to exclude International Flavor’s claims from coverage under the policy. Id. at *18-19.

The court reasoned that the Damage to Impaired Property not Physically Injured Exclusion only applies to damages to an insured’s own work arising out of its faulty workmanship. Id. at *20. Thus, because the claim was for damages to International Flavor’s property, the court found that this exclusion did not apply. See id. Similarly, the court concluded that the Recall of Products, Work or Impaired Property Exclusion also did not apply, as there was “no allegation of damages for extraneous recall costs . . . .” Id. at *21. Thirdly, despite the fact that the vanilla beans were an integral ingredient of the vanilla extract, the court refused to apply the Damage to Your Product Exclusion to exclude coverage for International Flavors, as the injury was to International Flavor’s product — the vanilla extract — and not to any product of Dammann’s. Id. at *21-24. Additionally, the court noted
that International Flavor's claims were not limited to damages to the vanilla extract alone, but also included allegations of damage to International Flavor's processing equipment. *Id.* at *24.

Finally, in opposition to Travelers' summary judgment motion, Dammann argued that the shut-down of its operations to clean and remediate the mercury contamination constituted “loss of use.” *Id.* at *24-27. The court agreed, reasoning that: “loss of a non-physical use of a product, such as offering it for sale, should be considered loss of use.” *Id.* at *25 (citing *Lucker Mfg., A Unit of Amclyde Engineered Prods., Inc. v. Home Ins. Co.*, 23 F.3d 808, 815 (3d Cir. 1995)). Although Travelers’ summary judgment motion did not address whether International Flavor’s cleaning and remediation of its own equipment constituted “property damage,” the court concluded that it did, and noted that that fact alone probably prevented the court from entering summary judgment in favor of Travelers. *Id.* at *26. Consequently, the court denied Travelers’ summary judgment motion. *Id.* at *26-27.


United National Insurance Company (“United National”) defended Clouse under a reservation of rights and then paid a settlement to Land O’Lakes and Dairy Marketing on Clouse’s behalf. *Id.* at *3. Subsequently, United National sought contribution and indemnity from St. Paul and Centennial Insurance Company, which had both denied coverage to Clouse for the underlying action. *Id.* St. Paul and Centennial moved for judgment on the pleadings. *Id.* at *1. St. Paul insured Clouse under a CGL policy, and Centennial insured Clouse under a Cargo Carrier Liability policy. *Id.* at *5, 18.

In entering judgment in favor of St. Paul, the court reasoned that in order to constitute an “occurrence” the conduct causing the harm must have been unintentional. *See id.* at *7-8. The underlying complaint’s causes of action included fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, negligence, breach of contract and vicarious liability. *Id.* at *3. The court considered each claim, but found that the alleged facts supporting each cause of action sounded in intentional conduct. *Id.* at *8.

Specifically, the court noted the underlying complaint alleged that Clouse knew the milk was contaminated and would not meet state safety requirements, that Clouse instructed its driver to deliver the milk anyway, and that Clouse forged the delivery receipt. *Id.* at *10-15. Because Clouse’s conduct was intentional, it could not be an accident, even if the conduct was designated in the complaint as merely negligent. *See id.* at *14. As a result, the court concluded that the St. Paul policy did not cover the fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation and negligence causes of action, as well as the vicarious liability claims based upon those causes of action. *Id.* at *10-15. The court also found that the St. Paul policy’s contractual liability exclusion excluded coverage for the breach of contract claim and the vicarious liability claim based upon that cause of action. *Id.* at *16-17.

With respect to Centennial’s policy, the court entered judgment in favor of Centennial’s favor for three reasons. *Id.* at *18-21. First, the policy only covered goods in transit, and because the milk was located in Land O’Lakes’ silo, coverage was never triggered. *Id.* at *18-19. Secondly, the policy provided that Centennial had the right, but not the duty, to defend Clouse. *Id.* at *19-20. Because there is no duty to defend where the policy does not impose one, the court concluded Centennial was not required to defend Clouse. *Id.* at *20. Thirdly, Centennial’s policy expressly provided that it was excess to “other insurance,” and therefore, would not be triggered until United National’s policy exhausted. *Id.* at *20-21. Because United National settled within its policy's
limits, Centennial was also not obligated to indem-
nify Clouse. Id at *21.

B. “Your Product” Exclusion


On January 29, 2008, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York applied the “your product” exclusion to exclude coverage for an insured’s contaminated food product. Tradin Organics USA, Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co., No. 06 Civ. 5494 (WHP), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5820 at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2008) (applying New Hampshire law). Canadian-based Crofters Food Ltd. (“Crofters”) purchased eighty metric tons of raspberry crumble from Tradin Organics USA, Inc.’s (“Tradin”) Amsterdam-based parent. Tradin Organics, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *1. In order to fulfill the order, Tradin subcontracted with a Serbian company, which agreed to deliver the crumble directly to Crofters. Id. at *2.

After Crofters accepted delivery of the crumble, the crumble “was discovered to contain plastic, pits, cherry stems, glass and other materials, and the Canadian government ordered it recalled.” Id. Tradin agreed to compensate Crofters in the amount of $214,444.32 for the contaminated crumble, and then filed a claim with Maryland. Id. Maryland denied coverage under the “your product” exclusion, which excluded coverage for “any property damage due to your product arising out of it or any part of it.” Id. at *3 (internal quotations omitted). The policy defined “your product” as “any goods or products . . . manufactured, sold, handled, distributed or disposed of by” Tradin. Id. at *3 (internal quotations omitted). Tradin then brought breach of contract and bad faith claims against Maryland, asserting that it had a right to full reimbursement of the settlement amount. Id. at *1-2. Both parties moved for summary judgment. Id. at *1.

In granting summary judgment for Maryland, the court determined that New Hampshire law applied to the claims, since Tradin was a New Hampshire company, the policy was delivered to a New Hampshire agent, and the premiums were paid from New Hampshire. Id. at *5-6. Because New Hampshire courts have not yet addressed the “your product” exclusion, however, the Tradin Organics court looked to New York and other jurisdictions and found that the “your product” exclusion unambiguously precludes coverage for “losses caused by a contaminated or defective product sold by the insured.” Id. at *7.

Consequently, the court entered summary judgment in favor of Maryland on Tradin’s breach of contract claim. Id. at *8.

The court also dismissed Tradin’s bad faith claim on the ground that absent a breach of contract, there is no bad faith. Id. at *9.

C. Pollution Exclusion


Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company (“Farm Bureau”) insured Composting Concepts, and after Composting Concepts assigned its rights under the CGL policy to Larson in settlement of Larson’s claims, Larson brought a garnishment action against Farm Bureau. Id. Farm Bureau denied coverage, relying in part on the policy’s pollution exclusion. Id. The trial court agreed with Farm Bureau and discharged the garnishment proceeding. Id. at *2-3.
On appeal, the primary dispute was whether the “living organisms, mold, bacteria, and bioaerosols that . . . were dispersed from the composting site fall within the policy’s definition of ‘pollutants.’” *Id.* at *4*. Larson argued that the term “pollutant” was ambiguous, and attempted to use extrinsic evidence in support of that argument. *Id.* at *6-8*. The appellate court, however, reasoned that previous decisions had already determined the pollution exclusion to be unambiguous, and as such, refused to consider any extrinsic evidence in construing “the plain language of the policy.” *Id.* at *6-7*.

Additionally, Larson argued that an ISO “Fungi or Bacteria Exclusion” created an ambiguity because the mere existence of the ISO form proved that the pollution exclusion encompassed only inorganic substances. *Id.* at *7*. Because Farm Bureau had not adopted the ISO “Fungi or Bacteria Exclusion,” and because it was not part of the Composting Concepts policy, the court also rejected this argument. *Id.* at *8*.

Next, Larson argued that an exception to the pollution exclusion applied. *Id.* at *15*. Because that exception did not become part of the Composting Concepts policy until 1999 — after the relevant time period — the court held that there was no basis upon which the exception could apply. *Id.* Finally, Larson attempted to argue that an actual injury trigger rule should apply. *Id.* Larson, however, failed to raise the trigger issue at the trial court level, and as such, the appellate court declined to address the argument. *Id.* at *15-16*.

In rejecting Larson’s arguments, the court reasoned that the essence of his claim was that “living organisms dispersed from the composting site contaminated or irritated” his body and home. *Id.* at *10*. The policy did not distinguish between organic and inorganic contaminants, and therefore, the court concluded that it would be difficult “to imagine a more clear-cut scenario where a substance could be classified as a contaminant.” *Id.* Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s application of the pollution exclusion to exclude coverage for Composting Concepts’ settlement of Larson’s claims. *See id.*

Following a general trend and the majority of jurisdictions that have ruled on the issue, the Larson decision affirms application of a CGL pollution exclusion in the context of biological contamination claims. As bodily injury and property damage contamination claims continue to increase, the Larson decision provides additional authority for insurers to rely upon the pollution exclusion in issuing reservation of rights and disclaimer of coverage letters in such claims.

2. We Will Sell No Brine Until It’s Time! The Eastern District of California Concludes That Widespread Dispersal of Saltwater Falls Within the Pollution Exclusion.

In July 2008, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California found that the “widespread flooding of a substantial amount of saltwater/brine from a commercial process pond onto adjacent agricultural land is decidedly what is commonly thought of pollution . . . and thus the damage caused by it is excluded from coverage . . . .” *National Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Martinelli*, No. 07-CV-01056-AWI-GSA, available at 2008 WL 2725070 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2008).

The insured, California Olive Growers, owned a process pond that flooded neighboring olive and grape vineyards with approximately 60 acre feet of saltwater. *Martinelli*, 2008 WL 2725070 at *1*. The high salt concentration killed the claimants’ olive trees and grape vines and substantially eradicated their crop yield. *Id.* The claimants filed suit against the insured, seeking $8.25 million in damages. *Id.*

The carriers denied coverage, and the claimants eventually secured a default judgment against the insured in the amount of $70,133,636. *Id.* The carriers then brought a declaratory relief action seeking a declaration that the insured’s policies did not cover the claimants’ property damage. *Id.* The claimants filed bad faith and breach of contract claims against the carriers. *Id.*

Ruling on the carriers’ motion for summary judgment, the court noted that the “dispositive question is whether the pollution exclusion . . . applies to exclude the damage caused by the flooding of the saltwater/brine.” *Id.* at *4*. The court answered that question in the affirmative, reasoning that the flooding was unintentional, substantially disseminated, and that, under the facts of this case, saltwater would be commonly thought of as pollution. *Id.* at *8*.
Although the claimants argued that saltwater is not a chemical, toxic or hazardous waste, and therefore, not “pollution,” the court rejected this argument, concluding that a massive amount of saltwater was an “impurity, something objectionable and unwanted that pollutes the crops and the soil they grow in . . . .” *Id.* at *11. Because the court found that the pollution exclusion applied, it dismissed the claimants’ counter-claims for bad faith and breach of contract. *Id.* at *12-13.

D. Impaired Property Exclusion

*Contaminated Bread Claims Do Not Rise to Coverage. Georgia Court of Appeals Applies Exclusion M.*


The restaurant asserted several causes of action against Lavoi, including breach of warranty, strict liability, deceptive trade practices, interference with business relations and violation of federal anti-trust laws. *Id.* at 394. After Lavoi tendered its defense to National Fire, National Fire denied coverage, applying Exclusion m., the impaired property exclusion. *Id.* The trial court entered summary judgment in National Fire’s favor. See *Id.* at 389.

On appeal, Lavoi argued that the restaurant may have been able to prove that the contaminated bread caused property damage to the restaurant and bodily injury to its customers. *Id.* at 395. The Georgia Court of Appeals rejected the insured’s argument, reasoning that “[t]here is no allegation in the complaint that any . . . customers sustained bodily injury.” *Id.*

Additionally, the court rejected the insured’s argument that the restaurant may have been able to prove that it sustained property damage because the definition of “impaired property” unambiguously included the contaminated bread the restaurant incorporated into its sandwiches. *Id.* The court further reasoned that even if the restaurant’s complaint had alleged property damage in the form of returned sandwiches, those damages would not have been covered through application of the impaired property exclusion. *Id.* Because there was no coverage, the appellate court also affirmed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment on the insured’s bad faith claim. *Id.* at 395-96.

E. Continuous Trigger / “Bodily Injury”

*Make My Day! The Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court Holds That The “Last Pull” of a Continuous Trigger Theory in a Bodily Injury Context is Manifestation of Injury.*


The insured, Polarome, distributed “food flavorings and fragrances, including diacetyl, a chemical used as a butter flavoring in the food industry.” *Polarome*, 961 A.2d at 33. One carrier insured Polarome from December 30, 1994 through December 17, 1998, and the other insured Polarome between December 31, 2003 and December 31, 2005. *Id.* at 33-34. In 2005, Polarome was named as a defendant in multiple lawsuits alleging serious bodily injuries as a result of exposure to and inhalation of diacetyl. *Id.* at 33.

One of the claimants alleged that he began inhaling diacetyl at his work place beginning in 1973, but his complaint did not allege the date of his last exposure or when he was diagnosed. *Id.* at 34. Both carriers defended this lawsuit under a reservation of rights, advising the insured that there was insufficient information to determine whether there was an occurrence resulting in bodily injury during their policy periods. *Id.* at 34-35. During discovery in the underlying action, this claimant testified that he was diagnosed with severe chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (“COPD”) in April 1991, and that he had a lung transplant in October 1993. *Id.* at 35-36.

A second claimant alleged that he inhaled diacetyl at his work place between September 2000 and November 2001. *Id.* During discovery in the underlying action, the second claimant testified that
the Social Security Administration considered him to be disabled in October 2002. Id. at 37. Only the insurer that was on the risk between December 31, 2003 and December 31, 2005 defended the second claimant’s lawsuit under a reservation of rights. See id. at 36-37.

In March 2006, the carrier that was on the risk between December 31, 2003 and December 31, 2005 denied a defense for the first claimant’s action, explaining that claimant was exposed to diacetyl only between 1973 and 1991, and its policy did not incept until December 2003. Id. at 37. Subsequently, in May 2006, the carrier that was on the risk between December 30, 1994 through December 17, 1998 denied coverage for the first claimant’s lawsuit for substantially the same reasons. Id.

In April 2006, the carrier that was on the risk between December 31, 2003 and December 31, 2005 also denied a defense for the second claimant’s action, explaining the claimant was only exposed to diacetyl between September 2000 and November 2001. Id. As a result, the second claimant did not sustain any bodily injury during that carrier’s policy period because his diagnosis and impairment predated the policy. Id.

Polarome then filed suit against the carriers, seeking a declaration that both carriers had a duty to defend and indemnify it in the first claimant’s action, and that the carrier that was on the risk between December 31, 2003 and December 31, 2005 also had a duty to defend and indemnify it against the second claimant’s action. Id. at 37. Both Polarome and the carriers filed motions for summary judgment. Id.

The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the carriers, concluding that the first claimant’s injury became manifest in October 1993 at the latest and that his exposure to diacetyl began in 1973 and ended by October 1993, and that the second claimant’s injury became manifest by March 2002 at the latest and his exposure to diacetyl ended at that time. Id. at 38. Polarome appealed, contending in part that the trial court misconstrued the continuous trigger theory, that separate bodily injuries can arise from one causative factor, and that coverage is triggered when each separate injury occurs. Id. at 39.

The appellate court found that the trial court properly applied a continuous trigger theory because the trial court recognized that the “underpinning of the continuous trigger theory” was that injury must occur during each policy period. See id. at 41. Next, the appellate court also upheld the trial court’s determination that policies during and prior to October 1993 were on the risk in the first claimant’s action and that the policies covering the period ending in September 2002 were on the risk in the second claimant’s action. Id. at 42-43.

Furthermore, the appellate court also upheld the trial court’s finding that “the last pull of the trigger is the initial manifestation of a diacetyl-related personal injury,” reasoning that only “undetectable injuries at and after exposure and prior to initial manifestation that are progressive and indivisible such that the occurrence of an injury cannot be known.” Id. at 45. Because both claimants’ diacetyl-related injuries manifested before any of the applicable policies incepted, the policies were not triggered, even under a continuous trigger theory. See id. at 43. In reaching its conclusion, the appellate court rejected Polarome’s argument that the proper termination point under a continuous trigger theory is when the claim is made. Id. at 45-47.

Finally, the appellate court rejected Polarome’s argument that the carriers improperly withdrew from their defense based upon extrinsic evidence learned during discovery in the underlying actions. Id. at 47-50. The court reasoned that the carriers initially defended under a reservation of rights and were entitled to a reasonable period of time to investigate whether the claims were covered. Id. at 50. Because the complaints were ambiguous with respect to the occurrences triggering coverage, the carriers could examine extrinsic evidence to determine the termination point of the continuous trigger, and therefore, withdraw from Polarome’s defense. Id.

III. Conclusion

The PCA outbreak is the latest in a series of international and national outbreaks to rock the U.S. food industry over the past three and a half years. The outbreak involves significant coverage issues for each and every entity involved in the food supply chain.
As the number, size and extent of food contamination outbreaks continue to increase, so will the multitude of insurance coverage issues raised throughout the global supply chain. As we have seen with the increasingly larger outbreaks, no jurisdiction will be left untouched by the related coverage issues. During the initial stages of this emerging long-term crises, insurers and insureds involved with the food industry must carefully examine and review policy language, insurance programs and claim determinations.

Endnotes

