The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia significantly expands the legal framework governing family violence. In recognizing a new tort of intimate partner violence, the Court acknowledged that coercive control within intimate relationships may create distinct legal harms not fully addressed by traditional tort claims.

In our previous alert, Supreme Court of Canada Recognizes New Tort of Intimate Partner Violence in Landmark Family Violence Decision, the Court’s recognition of the tort of intimate partner violence and the broader evolution of tort law in addressing family violence was examined.

However, the practical implications of the tort of intimate partner violence have yet to be clearly defined, including how provincial limitation periods apply.

It remains to be seen exactly how British Columbia’s Limitation Act, SBC 2012, c. 13 (the Act), will apply to the tort. Key questions that arise in this context include:

1. When is a claim for the tort of intimate partner violence discoverable pursuant to s. 8 of the Act; and
2. Whether the tort of intimate partner violence falls within any of the enumerated exceptions to limitation periods under s. 3 of the Act?

This article seeks to address these questions. However, the answers will ultimately depend on how the common law develops, and the application of limitation periods to this tort remains unsettled.

When is a Claim “Discovered” for the Tort of Intimate Partner Violence?

Section 6 of the Act provides that the basic limitation period must not be commenced more than two years after the date a claim is discovered. Failure to start a claim within the applicable limitation period will generally result in the claim being “statute-barred.”

Under section 8 of the Act, a claim is discovered on the first day when the claimant knew or reasonably ought to have known:

• injury, loss, or damage occurred;
• the injury was caused by an act or omission;
• the act or omission was attributable to the defendant; and
• a court proceeding would be an appropriate means to remedy the harm.

This raises the question of whether a claim for the tort of intimate partner violence was discovered if the factual basis to bring such a claim occurred more than two years ago. The requirement that the claimant knew or reasonably ought to have known a “court proceeding would be an appropriate means to seek to remedy the injury, loss or damage” has been interpreted in other provinces as relating to facts and not the law.¹

What this means is that the lack of awareness of a specific legal remedy does not necessarily delay the discovery or commencement of the limitation period. Absent a continuing course of conduct, claims in the tort of intimate partner violence based on facts occurring more than two years ago that satisfy the discovery requirements set out in s. 8 of the Act may then be statute‑barred.

A further related issue is whether the tort of intimate partner violence can continue post‑separation. The Supreme Court of Canada in Ahluwalia established three elements for the tort of intimate partner violence:

1. The conduct occurred within an intimate partnership or its aftermath;
2. The defendant intentionally engaged in the conduct; and
3. The conduct, considered objectively and cumulatively, amounted to coercive control that deprived the victim of dignity, autonomy, or equality within the relationship.

The Supreme Court of Canada did not appear to impose strict temporal limits on the tort. The reference to an intimate partnership’s “aftermath” in the first element of the test suggests that the tort could continue post-separation, although the exact definition of “aftermath” in this context remains to be seen. The practical implication of this is that the date a claim could be discovered could extend beyond separation if the facts of the case justify such a finding.

Is the Tort of Intimate Partner Violence Exempt from the Limitation Act?

Notwithstanding the above, the tort of intimate partner violence may be exempt from the application of the Act altogether. Section 3 of the Act states as follows:

Exempted claims

3 (1) This Act does not apply to the following:

11. a claim relating to assault or battery, whether or not the claimant’s right to bring the court proceeding was at any time governed by a limitation period, if the assault or battery occurred while the claimant

1. was a minor, or
2. was living in an intimate and personal relationship with, or was in a relationship of financial, emotional, physical or other dependency with, a person who performed, contributed to, consented to or acquiesced in the assault or battery;

In Hunt v. Hunt, 2024 BCSC 1048, the Court confirmed that the exemption in s. 3(1)(k)(ii) of the Act applies to assaults or batteries occurring prior to the parties’ separation. The question that arises is whether the tort of intimate partner violence constitutes a claim “relating to” assault or battery for the purposes of the Limitation Act. Not all claims advanced under this tort will qualify. Assault is defined as “the intentional creation of the apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive conduct,” while battery is “the intentional infliction of unlawful force on another person.”²

Accordingly, where a claim for intimate partner violence includes elements of coercive control that are sufficiently connected to acts of assault or battery occurring during the relationship, those aspects of the claim may fall within the exemption. However, because the tort is primarily grounded in patterns of coercive control, conduct that often does not meet the legal test for civil assault or battery may be caught by the two year limitation period.

Conclusion

The recognition of the tort of intimate partner violence in Ahluwalia marks a significant development in Canadian law, but it also raises complex and unresolved questions regarding the application of limitation periods in British Columbia. Whether such claims fall within the statutory exemptions for assault or battery, and how discoverability principles will apply remain open issues.

As this area of law continues to evolve, practitioners should approach limitation issues with caution and careful analysis as the development of the common law will be critical in shaping how and when these claims may be advanced.

¹ s. 8(d) of the Act.

² N.E.T. v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 2018 BCCA 380 at para. 27.