Precedential Opinions of Note
Intentional Omissions on IRS Forms are Affirmative Acts of Tax Evasion
United States v. Aumiller (July 1, 2026), No. 24-2742
https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/242742p.pdf
Majority decision: Schwartz (writing), Phipps, Rendell
Background
Defendant failed to disclose to the Internal Revenue Service certain bank accounts used to avoid collection of tax debt. A jury convicted him of multiple tax-evasion counts. On appeal, Defendant challenged the District Court’s denial of his motions to dismiss the indictments. Defendant argued that his omission of the bank accounts was not an affirmative act of evasion and that, even if it was, the Government did not sufficiently identify the use of false forms in the indictments.
Holding
The Court affirmed. It held that intentional omissions on forms submitted to the IRS are affirmative acts of tax evasion. The Court further explained that the District Court correctly denied Defendant’s motions to dismiss the indictments because the indictments alleged that Defendant used an undisclosed bank account, and the bill of particulars identified specific false IRS forms.
Key Quote
“Failure to report assets on the Forms would permit a taxpayer to ‘string the IRS along for his entire lifetime by racking up huge debts and then arranging generously slow repayment schedules using [Forms] that undersell his income and assets.’ Such conduct impedes the IRS’s collection of payments. Thus, we join our sister courts in holding that the filing of a Form that intentionally omitted assets from it constitutes an affirmative act of evasion.” (Slip Op. at 7 (citation omitted).)
False Claims Act Retaliation Requires an Objectively Reasonable Belief the Employer Submitted False Claims
Lisenby v. Olympus Corporation of the Americas (August 4, 2026), No. 25-1480
https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/251480p.pdf
Quorum decision: Chagares (writing), Rendell, Scirica1
Background
Plaintiff raised concerns to other employees that his employer violated U.S. Food and Drug Administration regulations. The company eliminated Plaintiff’s position after he raised these concerns, and Plaintiff sued for retaliation under the False Claims Act’s anti-retaliation provision, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). The District Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims, concluding that Plaintiff had not engaged in protected conduct under the “other efforts” prong of the anti-retaliation provision because Plaintiff had not connected his concerns to false claims submissions for payment to the federal government.
Holding
The Third Circuit affirmed. It held that plaintiffs must hold an “objectively reasonable belief” that their employer was violating or about to violate the FCA to engage in protected “other efforts” conduct. In addition, it held that FCA retaliation claims are not subject to the Rule 9(b) particularity requirement because such claims do not involve allegations of fraud.
Key Quote
“[W]e have not yet considered what constitutes protected conduct under the ‘other efforts’ prong of the FCA’s anti-retaliation provision, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(1). As explained below, we hold that a plaintiff’s actions constitute protected conduct under the ‘other efforts’ prong of § 3730(h)(1) when they are motivated by an objectively reasonable belief that the employer has submitted, or will submit, false or fraudulent claims for payment to the federal government.” (Slip Op. at 3.)
Opening Statements Can Trigger the Waiver Provision of a Proffer Agreement
United States v. Tavares (August 17, 2026), No. 25-1489
https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/251489p.pdf
Quorum decision: Ambro (writing), Hardiman, Scirica2
Background
Defendant executed a proffer agreement containing a waiver provision. The waiver provision allowed the Government to use Defendant’s admissions to rebut evidence or arguments offered on his behalf. At trial, the Government successfully moved to introduce Defendant’s proffered admissions to contradict his counsel’s representations during the opening statements.
Holding
The Third Circuit affirmed. It concluded that defense counsel’s arguments during his opening statement triggered the waiver provision because he advanced factual arguments that were inconsistent with his client’s proffered admissions.
Key Quote
“We have characterized waivers like the one here — forgoing objecting to the admission of proffered statements to rebut any evidence or arguments offered on [the defendant’s] behalf—as expansive .... We hold that this language extends further to opening statements where defense counsel affirmatively advances factual arguments inconsistent with the defendant’s proffered admissions.” (Slip Op. at 7 (internal quotations and citations omitted).)
Immunity Under the Speech or Debate Clause is Limited to Actions Integral to the Legislative Process
United States v. McIver (August 26, 2026), Nos. 25-3573 & 26-1122
https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/253573p.pdf
Majority decision: Chung (writing), Bibas
Dissent: Ambro
Background
Defendant, a member of the U.S. House of Representatives, attempted to interfere with an arrest that occurred while she was conducting an unannounced oversight inspection of an immigration detention facility. The Government charged Defendant with three counts of assaulting, impeding, or interfering with a federal official. Defendant moved to dismiss the Indictment by arguing she had legislative immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause, and the District Court denied her motion.
Holding
The Court affirmed the District Court’s denial of legislative immunity on Counts One and Two. It held that the conduct charged in Counts One and Two was non-legislative because it was not integral to the legislative process. In addition, the Court vacated and remanded for the District Court to determine whether the conduct charged in Count Three included legislative acts since it had failed to separately assess the full range of conduct charged.
Key Quote
“[T]he nature of the conduct charged in Count One is non-legislative. [Defendant’s] physical contact with [the federal official] was not ‘integral’ to the ‘deliberative and communicative processes by which Members participate in committee and House proceedings’ — namely, to her inspection of [the immigration detention facility]. This conclusion would hold regardless of whether [Defendant] had physical contact with [the federal official] inside [the immigration detention facility] or outside of it, just as the Speech or Debate Clause protects [Defendant’s] legitimate legislative fact-finding, whether such fact-finding occurs on or off the facility’s property. ... Like the acts charged in Count One, the acts of pushing past and forcibly striking someone [as charged in Count Two] are unambiguously non-legislative ... ” (Slip Op. at 16-17, 19 (citation omitted).)
Dissent
Judge Ambro wrote separately to disagree with the Majority’s conclusion that the conduct charged in Count Two was unambiguously non-legislative. He contended that the extrinsic evidence “raises alarm bells” that the Executive Branch was attempting to “punish a Member for an act involving legislative fact finding.” (Dissent at 5-6 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).) Instead, Judge Ambro would have vacated and remanded for additional fact-finding to determine whether the physical contact described in Count Two was incidental to re-entering the facility that federal law authorized Defendant to inspect.
Supervised Release Term Can Be Terminated Only After One Year
United States v. Santana-Robles (September 23, 2026), No. 26-1011
https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/261011p.pdf
Unanimous decision: Rendell (writing), Bibas, and Hardman
Background
After violating the conditions of his supervised release, the District Court sentenced Defendant to a term of imprisonment, followed by a new term of supervised release. Less than two months into his new term of supervised release, Defendant moved for early termination. The District Court denied Defendant’s motion. On appeal, the Government argued the District Court lacked the authority to grant Defendant’s requested relief because Defendant’s motion was premature under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1), which allows the District Court to terminate supervised release “at any time after the expiration of one year of supervised release.”
Holding
The Third Circuit affirmed. It held that Section 3583(e)(1) permits early termination only after a defendant has served one year of the specific term of supervised release he seeks to terminate.
Key Quote
“In sum, the text, purpose, and history all support the common sense reading that the one-year clock starts from the beginning of the current term of supervised release that a defendant may seek to terminate. Because Appellant filed his motion less than two months into his term of supervised release, his request was foreclosed by Section 3583(e)(1), and the District Court did not have the authority to grant his request.” (Slip Op. at 7.)
Non-Precedential Opinions of Note
United States v. Alexander (June 30, 2026), No. 23-1371
https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/231371np.pdf
The District Court imposed an above-Guidelines sentence, which it characterized as an upward departure during the sentencing hearing. The District Court subsequently characterized its sentence as a variance in its Statement of Reasons. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded for resentencing, holding that “[s]entencing courts must articulate whether they are imposing a departure or a variance from the Sentencing Guidelines range.” (Slip Op. at 1.) The Third Circuit further explained that it will “vacate and remand for resentencing unless the record shows the error did not affect the sentence.” (Id.)
United States v. Comprehensive Healthcare Management Services (July 7, 2026), Nos. 25-2029 & 25-2030
https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/252029np.pdf
A jury convicted Defendants of falsifying material facts in connection with the delivery and payment of health care benefits. Defendants challenged the District Court’s instruction on materiality for failing to specify that the falsehoods must have influenced a decision impacting Medicare or Medicaid payments. The Third Circuit affirmed the conviction, holding that the District Court’s instruction was “entirely consistent with [Third Circuit] law on materiality even though [the instruction] d[id] not specify the decision the statement was capable of influencing.” (Slip Op. 6.)
In re: Liptor Antitrust Litigation (August 13, 2026), Nos. 24-2184, 24-2185, 24-2189, 24-2194, 24-2202, 24-2203, 24-2256 & 24-2257
https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/242184np.pdf
Defendants entered into a settlement agreement with each other that granted one defendant license to launch its generic drug product by a particular date, pending FDA approval. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants’ settlement agreement constituted an anti-competitive scheme to delay the market entry of the generic drug. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, finding that Plaintiffs did not have antitrust standing because they had failed to show, absent the settlement agreement, that the FDA would have approved the generic drug. The Third Circuit affirmed, explaining that Plaintiffs did not “show that it is more likely that not that approval would have occurred” before the date certain. (Slip Op. 14 (internal quotation marks omitted).)